But we might also ask whether we have a moral obligation to increase (or maximize) our moral obligations (or maximize), whether the truth of principles such as (D) or (D*) can provide a defense against other normative ethical claims (e.g., the moral lie of imposing risks by invoking to reduce odds). an obligation not to violate or allow harm to be harmed), if the fact that an obligation that affects your chances of accomplishment is generated by a certain type of duty affects the moral status of a randomly influencing act (e.g., directed or undirected or perfect or imperfect), and if there is a difference in the moral status of random actions, if they are obligations we have to those with whom we have a special relationship. Many of the actions we take affect the chances of fulfilling our moral obligations. The moral status of such actions is important and deeply neglected. In this article, I begin to correct this negligence by asking the following question: under what conditions, if any, is it morally reprehensible to perform an action that reduces the likelihood that someone will fulfill a moral obligation? In §1, I introduce this question and motivate with its response to the concern. I maintain in § 2 that certain actions which an agent has good reason to believe will significantly reduce his chances of fulfilling a moral obligation in the future compared to at least one available alternative action are morally reprehensible pro tanto. This answer, I argue, reflects our intuitions in a number of cases, avoids the problems encountered by other points of view discussed here and can presumably be defended against some independent objections. I conclude in § 3 by noting some consequences for the normative and practical ethics of the moral lie of at least certain actions that reduce the chances of fulfilling our moral obligations, and by raising a number of important questions relating to these actions for future consideration. I have three directions that I would like to explore in my research. First, I would like to take a closer look at the impact of competition on companies` obligations to comply with unenforced or unenforced laws. Are there situations where a highly competitive market really makes it impossible to comply with an unenforced law? If so, could the moral obligation to support important legal institutions be fulfilled by participating in some sort of institution-building? However, because of my inner moral obligation, I feel guilty every time I pass a stranded motorist. It`s even worse to hitchhike. He will look you in the eye with an expression of supplication.
I think that to categorize a good that we do as a good that we do out of moral obligation, it should be done selflessly and without anything in return. But I don`t think that`s the case most of the time. In a pluralistic society with many different subcultures, it is easier for people to agree on what each person is entitled to than on what each person owes to others. Suppose, for example, that in one culture, some child-rearing tasks are duties of the father, and in another similar task, duties of the mother or maternal uncle. Members of different cultures may disagree on the moral duties of maternal fathers, mothers, and uncles, but still be able to agree that a child should receive such care. I would like to make three concluding remarks. First, if (D) or (D*) is true, then this is an important finding for normative and practical ethical investigations. Prima facie, (D) means that actions that we perform regularly and that reduce the chances of fulfilling a moral obligation in the relevant way are morally reprehensible. And (D*) seems to result in many types of actions that would do him justice – such as smoking, regular drug abuse, and gross neglect of physical and mental well-being, among others – are morally reprehensible. This is an opportunity to generate new arguments about the moral status of such actions. It`s great for people to want to help others.
But sometimes I`m not sure they do it out of moral obligation or in the hope of getting something else in return. I am a small business owner and I find it quite difficult to develop policies that everyone agrees with. This is especially true when it comes to whether or not to include a particular charity in our Christmas party. I don`t want people to feel compelled to donate to the charity I choose just because I think it`s a good thing. As mentioned earlier, it would be considered a negative obligation as it would generally only require the waiver of acts of disclosure. In many cases, however, special precautions should be taken to avoid disclosing a customer`s confidential information – for example, if you need to protect part of a new model from the public. In this case, the commitment would require positive action and would therefore have the characteristics of a positive engagement. This example illustrates some of the judgments that must be made when applying ethical concepts. But again, the existence of a moral obligation to correct your behavior in the car* requires explanation. And (D) provides the following: The reason you are under a moral obligation (pro tanto) to get out of your car and take the bus is that driving your car to Adam compared to the bus ride is an act that you have good reason to believe is very unlikely to fulfill your obligation to Adam.
These concerns therefore provide no reason to reject (D) (or (D*) in similar cases) in the face of modal changes in cases such as Car* (or Pill). Finally, if there are conditions that, for example, make it morally reprehensible to perform actions that reduce the chances of fulfilling our moral obligations, then this creates a condition of adequacy hitherto unnoticed for general normative ethical theories: any theory that claims to explain the moral status of all morally evaluable actions must be able to explain the moral status of those actions. Another possible reason to believe that the moral lie of performing random actions that fulfill (D) is pro tanto is that the lie of performing an action that you have good reason to believe significantly reduces the likelihood of performing an obligation could be offset by the fact that the agent has finally fulfilled the obligation. Since I have put these questions in parentheses, I am just stating it here. According to (B), your action would be morally reprehensible. But this doesn`t seem morally reprehensible, although compared to any other action available to you (such as donating to another charity), it greatly reduces the chances of fulfilling your moral obligation to help end extreme poverty. (B) is therefore incorrect. In one of these books, he discussed at length the nature of moral theory.
He talked about the concept of fairness or good and evil. He said that people have this innate belief that good and evil exist, and the fact that it exists proves that it was given by God. This is how powerful religion was to him. He was not only honest; He paid a moral debt imposed on him by his faith. Note that the term “good reason to believe” refers to the possession of normative epistemic reasons to believe that an action is likely to have certain effects on the objective probability of fulfilling a moral obligation. An anonymous reviewer usefully highlighted another notable option that cannot be discussed here due to space constraints: qualification (C) for impact on the likelihood of fulfilling the commitment that the agent could reasonably expect to have discovered. But I note that the point of view I ultimately defend could easily be revised in this way if necessary. It`s not true.
Suppose you call Adam on the way to the hospital in the car variant above to apologize for the detour. Note that your apology may not seem inappropriate, as you are doing something that makes it very unlikely that you will succeed in fulfilling your moral obligation to Him. But if you didn`t make a mistake in making the detour, it would be inappropriate to apologize. This objection therefore fails. On the other hand, (A) is very demanding. It states that any action that reduces your chances of fulfilling a moral obligation is wrong. This means that any random action that reduces the chances of fulfilling a moral obligation, even to a very small extent, compared to another action is bad. (D) and (D*) do not do so, as Agents have good reason to believe that they will significantly reduce the likelihood of fulfilling a moral obligation (compared to at least one other available action) only with respect to certain actions. However, even if (the transmission) is true, it cannot explain the moral lie of taking my car in the car*. Because if my car reduces the chances of fulfilling my moral obligation to Adam, it`s not a necessary way to help him.